Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (scotus)

In Ciminelli v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second Circuit's right-to-control theory of wire fraud cannot be used as the basis for a conviction under federal fraud statutes. Louis Ciminelli was convicted of federal wire fraud for his involvement in a scheme to rig the bid process for state-funded development projects under Governor Andrew Cuomo. The Government relied on the right-to-control theory, which establishes wire fraud by depriving a victim of potentially valuable economic information. The conviction turned on whether the Second Circuit's established "righto-to-control" theory is sufficient to establish federal wire fraud. The Supreme Court held that the right to valuable economic information is not a traditional property interest and therefore cannot form the basis for a wire fraud conviction under the relevant statutes. Read by Jake A. Leahy. 

In Percoco v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether a private citizen with influence over government decision-making can be convicted for wire fraud on the theory that he or she deprived the public of its “intangible right of honest services.” Joseph Percoco, former Executive Deputy Secretary to New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, was charged with conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud. Percoco accepted payments while on hiatus from government service to assist a real-estate development company (while he was running Governor Cuomo's re-election campaign for eight months). The trial court instructed the jury based on the Second Circuit's 1982 decision in Margiotta, which held that a private person can commit honest-services fraud if they dominate and control government decisions. The Supreme Court ruled that instructing the jury based on Margiotta was an error, stating that the Margiotta theory was overly vague and lacked sufficient clarity. Reversed and remanded. Read by Jake A. L

In Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, the Supreme Court reviewed two questions. First, whether §1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional; and second, whether a non-citizen is required to request reconsideration of an adverse board action to fully exhaust administrative remedies under the law. HELD: Santos-Zacaria is correct and the Fifth Circuit was incorrect to find that §1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional. The statute in question is not jurisdictional, as Congress did not clearly demonstrate that it intended to make the statute jurisdictional. Second, the law does not require non-citizens to request discretionary forms of review, such as asking a Board to reconsider its ruling, because the law only requires the exhaustion of remedies as "right," while discretionary actions involve the discretion of the administrative agencies. Vacated in part and remanded. Read the entire opinion here. Read by Jake A. Leahy. 

Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. (Halkbank) vs. the United States involves the criminal prosecution against Halkbank for evading American economic sanctions against Iran.  Halkbank claims immunity, as an instrumentality of a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). The Supreme Court held that the District Court has jurisdiction over this criminal prosecution of Halkbank, that the FSIA's comprehensive scheme governing claims of immunity in civil actions against foreign states, and their instrumentalities does not cover criminal cases. The Court concluded that the FSIA's provisions extend only to the civil context. Guest recorded by Jeff Barnum. 

Section 363(m) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is not a jurisdictional provision. Courts should not construe a statute to be jurisdictional unless clearly stated. A jurisdictional provisions puts a limit on the jurisdiction of federal courts. Guest recorded by Jeff Barnum. 

In Wilkins v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed a dispute between property owners in rural Montana and the government regarding a road easement. The government claimed that the easement included public access, while the property owners disagreed. The property owners sued the government under the Quiet Title Act, but the government argued that their claim was barred by a 12-year time limit in the Act. The Court held that the time limit was a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule and not a jurisdictional bar. It concluded that the Act's text and context did not indicate a clear statement of jurisdictional consequences. The Court also determined that previous Supreme Court decisions did not definitively interpret the relevant statute as jurisdictional. Justice Sotomayor delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Syllabus read by guest reader Jeff

New York and New Jersey entered into a compact in 1953 to establish the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor to conduct regulatory and law enforcement activities at the Port, and in 2018, New Jersey sought to withdraw from the Compact, resulting in New York filing a bill of complaint in this Court. HELD: Despite New York's opposition, New Jersey is permitted to withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact. Recorded by Jeff Barnum. 

Michelle Cochran and Axon Enterprise each filed a federal district court lawsuit, challenging the constitutionality of the agency proceedings against them in separate enforcement actions initiated in the SEC and the FTC. Both suits were initially dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed as to the SEC question, finding that Cochran's claim would not receive "meaningful judicial review" in a court of appeals, was "wholly collateral to the Exchange Act's statutory-review scheme," and fell "outside the SEC's expertise." The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Axon's constitutional challenges to the FTC proceeding. HELD: District court's continue to have jurisdiction over federal questions arising from constitutional challenges, notwisthstanding the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. 

Miguel Luna Perez, a deaf student who attended schools in Michigan's Sturgis Public School District, was denied graduation. his family filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education claiming that the district failed to provide him with a free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The parties reached a settlement, and Perez then sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), seeking compensatory damages, but the district court dismissed the suit, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed; based on IDEA's requirement that plaintiffs exhaust administrative procedures before seeking relief that is also available under IDEA. HELD: The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act does not require Perez to exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action, because IDEA does not provide for compensatory damages. 

The Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler's Checks Act requires that abandoned property from a "money order . . . or other similar written instrument," be returned to the state where the property was purchased. This rule is different from the common law, which requires that unclaimed property be returned to the state of incorporation, not the state of purchase. The Supreme Court held that Agent Checks and Teller's Checks, offered by MoneyGram, were sufficiently similar to a money order to be governed by the statutory framework. As a result, these products offered by MoneyGram should be returned to the state of purchase when unclaimed, rather than the state of incorporation (most often, Delaware). Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the unanimous court (although the Court was not unanimous for a portion of the decision, there is no dissent regarding that portion). Delaware v. Pennsylvania

In Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, the Supreme Court held that the discharge exceptions under Section 523(a)(2)(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code apply to an individual debtor, regardless of said debtor's culpability in the fraud. Recorded by Jake Leahy. Bartenwerfer v. Buckley

Bittner, was required to file reports under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). In 2004, Congress amended the law to create a penalty for the non-willful failure to file certain reports pertaining to foreign bank accounts. After filing reports, Bittner was assessed penalties for over fifty accounts that he had failed to report over several years. The Secretary of the Treasury assessed a penalty for his non-willful failure to file in the amount of $10,000 per account per year, while Bittner claimed the amount should be $10,000 per annual report. Bittner was assessed a penalty of $2.7 million. The Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the United States. Bittner appealed. Justice Gorsuch wrote the opinion of the court reversing the Fifth Circuit, finding in favor of Bittner. Recorded by Jake Leahy. Bittner v. United States

In Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., et al. v. Hewitt, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee paid a daily rate does not qualify for an exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime pay requirements, unless they satisfy the conditions set out in Section 541.604(b). Michael Hewitt, a former employee of Helix, sued his employer claiming overtime pay under FLSA, as he worked 84 hours a week while on the vessel, but Helix paid him a daily-rate basis with no overtime compensation. The Court concluded that Hewitt was not paid on a salary basis as defined in Section 602(a), and thus was not an executive exempt from FLSA's overtime pay guarantee.

Cruz v. Arizona is a case heard by the US Supreme Court that questioned whether the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling was an adequate ground to preclude review of a federal question. The petitioner, John Montenegro Cruz, was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death, and argued that under Simmons v. South Carolina, he should have been allowed to inform the jury that a life sentence in Arizona would be without parole. Cruz sought to raise the Simmons issue again in a state post-conviction petition under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after concluding that Lynch was not "a significant change in the law". The US Supreme Court held that the Arizona Supreme Court's holding that Lynch was not a significant change in the law is an exceptional case where a state-court judgment rests on such a novel and unforeseeable interpretation of a state-court procedural rule that the decision is not adequate to foreclose review of the federal claim

Rodney Reed was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death in Texas. He filed a motion under Texas's post-conviction DNA testing law, requesting DNA testing on certain evidence, which he believed would help identify the true perpetrator. The state trial court denied Reed's motion, citing an inadequate chain of custody for the evidence he sought to test. Reed then sued in federal court, arguing that Texas's post-conviction DNA testing law violated procedural due process. The Fifth Circuit dismissed Reed's claim as time-barred, but the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for a procedural due process claim begins to run when the state litigation ends, in this case when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Reed's motion for rehearing. The Court ultimately reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In Arellano v. McDonough, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Section 5110(b)(1) of the Veterans' Benefits Act is not subject to equitable tolling. The case involves the effective date of an award of disability compensation to a veteran of the United States military. Adolfo Arellano applied to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for disability compensation based on his psychiatric disorders approximately 30 years after his honorable discharge from the Navy. Arellano argued that his award's effective date should be governed by an exception in § 5110(b)(1), which makes the effective date the day following the date of the veteran's discharge or release if application is received within one year of such date. However, the Supreme Court held that equitably tolling the provision would depart from the terms that Congress "specifically provided."